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Monday, August 4, 2014

50 years ago today: Tonkin false flag attack kills millions

"This ship is allegedly uh to be attacked tonight."
                  - Defense Secretary to President before phony attack.
Fifty years ago today, on the 4th of August 1964, the claim was made that North Vietnamese PT boats attacked US warships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Based on that claim, Congress passed the "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution empowering the Commander-in-Chief to "do whatever may be necessary." As a result of what was seen as "necessary," more than fifty-thousand Americans and some three million Vietnamese would be slaughtered over the next eight years in the war authorized by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

However, the claimed 4th of August attacks that were the casus belli for the Vietnam War never took place. It was a hoax perpetrated on the World by the White House and as I revealed in Vietnam: American Holocaust, US President Lyndon B Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara were at the center of it.

White House recordings are made public after forty years, so one advantage I had in doing this documentary in 2006-2008, as compared to earlier works, was access to White House tapes [ as well as other documentation released by statue after 40 years. ] for those war years. This included the White House tapes for 4 August 1964, the day of the so-called Gulf of Tonkin attack. This co-incidentally was also the day that the FBI found the three slain civil rights workers. ["Mississippi Burning"] They reported to the White House which then decided how to make the news public. All and all a "big news" day at the White House and the recordings are an incredible record of how LBJ juggled these two major events.
a day in the life...August 4, 1964

At 9:15pm LBJ is on the phone planning his announcement of the bombing of North Vietnam in response to the alleged Gulf of Tonkin attacks and tells McNamara "I don't see why we bring Goldwater in on this. Why don't we just say I felt it appropriate just to communicate my decision to the Republican candidate for president. And I'll say he's assured me of his full support. I think it makes us sound like we're very much together and buddies and agreein' on bombing everybody."

Twenty minutes later he is on the phone with the Governor of Mississippi about the found bodies of Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney. He tells the Govenor "I've been in this Vietnam Security Council and we're, uh, we're having to retaliate out there tonight, uh, that this shooting that took place at our destroyer today. I'm goin' on television after a while, as soon as I get our planes off the ground, and tell the people about it."

Then he gets to the business of finding the killers of the civil rights workers. The President tells the Governor "I thought I'd better talk to you. I know you're gonna do everything you can to apprehend 'em. And anyway in the world we can help, we want to do it." When the Governor pledges continued cooperation, Johnson tells him "You've, uh, you certainly, uh, acted fine under all the circumstances. And I certainly do appreciate you attitude and your cooperation."
Most significantly, the first discussion of the North Vietnamese "surprise" attack takes place before the attack with McNamara and Johnson already planning their response "in the event this attack takes place within the next six to nine hours." No such attack took place 50 years ago today even though it was dutifully reported by the task force commander and used to justify a war by the President. While it has long been conceded, even in the official Navy records that "that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night," These recordings provide the "smoking gun" that shows the fraud used to justify the murder of millions involved the very highest levels of the US government.

Vietnam: American Holocaust was the first documentary to reveal this "smoking gun" to the World. Below is the screenplay of the section on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident from the film:

Section Break: Tonkin
Scene is LBJ cabinet meeting.
LBJ wanted to greatly expand the war but the resolution he had put to congress had been shelved for months.
Subtitles for tape of LBJ and McNamara.
LBJ: I want is somebody that can lay up some plans to trap these guys...and whoop the hell out of 'em. Kill some of 'em that's what I want to do.

McNamara: I’ll try to bring something back to meet with that objective.

LBJ: OK Bob.
After what he called 'an unprovoked attack', he got his resolution.
Cronkite is off camera.
Congressional leaders of both parties supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. In fact only two members of congress voted against the resolution, Senators Morse of Oregon and Greuning of Alaska.
Senator Morse at a press conference.
Being in the minority never proves that you're wrong. In fact, history is going to record that Senator Greuning and I voted in the interest of the American people this morning when we voted against this resolution.

And I'd have the American people remember what this resolution really is. It's a resolution which seeks to give the President of the United States the power to make war without a declaration of war.
Cronkite is now on camera announcing. Then film of planes being launched from an aircraft carrier.
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was not a Declaration of War. There never was a declaration of war in Vietnam but it served much the same purpose. The president was given broad powers to wage war. But what the congress did not know, what the country did not know is that the second attack in the Gulf of Tonkin may never have happened.
Camera zooms to high lighted words on U.S. Navy website.

It is now known beyond any reasonable doubt that an attack did not take place. Even the official U.S. Navy history states "that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night."
Senator Fullbright speaks to camera, continues speaking as McNamara is shown giving briefing.

If one telegram, which we later found from Commander Herrick of the Maddox, had been made available to the Committee at that time, I’m quite sure they would have had long hearings, gone into it thoroughly. And if they had been able to discover the facts as they were, I don’t believe they’d have pasted the Resolution, because it was based on absolutely false, erroneous information. The events that they related then on August 4, 1964, were not true. Our ships were -it was not an unprovoked, deliberate attack; in fact there was no attack at all.
Scenes of the Maddox
Did the captains report what they were ordered to report?
Morley Safer on the Maddox. Safer interviews Herricks on a ship.
Morley Safer: It’s also been suggested that Washington was putting a great deal of pressure on you to come up with some positive answers to what happened that night. A positive answer being, “Yes, we were attacked."

Captain herrick: Well, I’m sure they needed one. And that’s what we were trying to obtain for them and we did and sent it in.
Scenes of outside of Maddox.

Did the gunners shell an empty gulf?
Guns, radar, sonar panel
Morley Safer: Just above the bridge of the Maddox where Captain Herrick was is the main
gun director. And inside the director was a sailor who was in charge of firing those powerful five-inch guns. His job was to open fire once the enemy targets were spotted on radar or sonar. Those are the main methods for detecting targets you can't see directly. The man in charge of the main gun director, August 4, 1964, was a four-year veteran, he was also an expert sonar man, Patrick Park. Park is now a businessman in Los Angeles.
Safer interviews Park in an office.
Morley Safer: Tell me, do you think that night, August 4, 1964, in the pitch black, in the heavy swell, rain storms, was there anything to shoot at out there?

Park: No, I don’t-I’m certain that there was not anything to shoot at, right from the beginning. The Captain asked me immediately after the attack, to go down and evaluate all the recordings that had been made of noise that was-that sonar was recording. And I kept myself pretty busy for the next three days really trying to evaluate these things and determine if we had heard anything that might have been even a question mark, that might have been a torpedo or anything else in the water not related to the two ships or noise of either one of them.

Morley Safer: And what was your evaluation?

Park: Absolutely nothing.
Scenes of air craft carrier.

The pilots didn’t see anything either. Before James Bond Stockdale became a North Vietnamese prisoner of war, he was flying air cover over the destroyers at the time of the alleged second attack.
Scenes of Stockdale and squad.
In Stockdales words “I flew so low there was salt spray on my windshield and I still didn’t see a thing” Meaning he never saw torpedoes or any evidence that the U.S. ships had been fired upon. The captain of the Ticonderoga attack squadron 56, Commander Wesley L. MacDonald concurred. He didn’t see anything that night except the Maddox and the Tuner Joy.

After this flight he and those in his command met behind closed doors and each wrote accounts of what he did and didn’t see. Stockdale then locked these in his safe. The next morning Stockdale was ordered to lead the first strike on North Vietnam.
Senator Fullbright speaks to camera, like before.
I personally am convinced, in my own mind, that no attack took place on the 4th. Of course it’s impossible, in a way, for me to prove a negative. I’ll put it this way. They certainly did not prove the affirmative case that there was an attack.
Scenes of ships in Tonkin Gulf, then many B52s flying in formation.

Since there was no second attack, and since that attack was the excuse that the President used to take the U.S. to war in Vietnam, what are we to make of the following recently released White House tape? In it LBJ and McNamara discuss the second Gulf of Tonkin attack before it takes place. How would they know about the attack before it happened and why would they want to keep that prior knowledge a secret, unless they were planning it?
Phone call between McNamara and LBJ with sub-titles.
MCNAMARA: Now this is an action that we might well wish to consider after the second attack. But I think it would be inappropriate, and General Wheeler agrees, and Dean Rusk agrees, inappropriate to provide the task force commander that authority. There will be ample time for us, after a second attack, to bring this problem to your attention, and you can then decide how far you wish to pursue the attacker into his base area....

LBJ: but I wish we could have something that we already picked out, and uh

MCNAMARA: We'll see

LBJ: and just hit about three of them damned quick. Right after

MCNAMARA: We will have that, and, and I, I've talked to Mac Bundy [national security adviser] a moment ago and told him that I thought that was the most important subject we should consider today, and, and be prepared to recommend to you a response, a retaliation move against North Vietnam in the event this attack takes place within the next six to nine hours. And we

LBJ: All right. Now we better do that at lunch. There's some things I don't want to go in with these other, I want to keep this as close as I can. So let's just try to keep it to the two.

MCNAMARA: I will be prepared to do so at lunch.
NVA General Phung The Tai in uniform speaks to camera, fade to single large bomb being dropped on Vietnam.
On the night of August 4, the United States made public that so-called "Gulf of Tonkin incident." But the story was a fabrication, created by the U.S. National Security Council. Even as the National Security Council met, American aircraft were being sent to destroy several areas of our country. In reality, the second Gulf of Tonkin incident never happened.
Was the whole basis of this war a fraud and a lie perpetrated at the highest levels of our government? We must ask ourselves that as we survey the damage that was done to ourselves and especially to Vietnam.

Buy the DVD from the Vietnam: American Holocaust website or Amazon.com

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